Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure?
比较家族企业与非家族企业的自愿性信息披露行为，发现家族企业更少发布盈利预测和电话会议，但更多发布盈利预警，原因在于家族所有者更关注长期投资和声誉风险。
ABSTRACT We examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family firms. We find that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls, but more earnings warnings. Whereas the former is consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon, better monitoring of management, and lower information asymmetry between owners and managers, the higher likelihood of earnings warnings is consistent with family owners having greater litigation and reputation cost concerns. We also document that family ownership dominates nonfamily insider ownership and concentrated institutional ownership in explaining the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. Using alternative proxies for the founding family's presence in the firm leads to similar results.