Affiliated Banker on Board and Conservative Accounting
研究发现，银行通过派驻董事进入借款企业董事会（关联银行家）能降低信息不对称，从而减少企业对保守会计（如及时确认损失）的需求，因为银行可依赖私人信息及时重新谈判。
ABSTRACT We examine the effect of lender monitoring through board representation, which we label “affiliated banker on board” (AFB) on conservative accounting. We hypothesize that monitoring reduces lenders' demand for conservatism-facilitated control transfers through debt covenants by reducing the information asymmetry that underlies the agency problem of debt. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that AFB firms have markedly lower conservative accounting than non-AFB firms. This result is robust to a battery of tests that account for bias from both observable and unobservable factors. We also find additional evidence to support key elements of our hypothesis. First, an examination of the relation between borrower-unfavorable renegotiations and covenant violations suggests that board representation allows lenders to renegotiate in a timelier manner based on private information. Second, an examination of the relation between covenant intensity and conservative accounting suggests that board representation decreases lenders' reliance on conservatism-facilitated control transfers. Finally, an analysis that uses relationship lending as an alternative proxy of lender monitoring suggests that it is lender monitoring, and not AFB per se, that reduces demand for conservative accounting. JEL Classifications: G3; G21; M41 Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.