Agency Theory in Practice: a Qualitative Study of Hedge Fund Activism in Japan
通过定性研究，考察日本企业对冲基金激进主义的反应，发现标准委托代理模型在日本情境下适用性较弱，管理者不视自己为股东代理人，股东也不以委托人身份行事。
Abstract Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue We look at the reaction to hedge fund activism of managers and shareholders in J apanese firms and explore the implications of our findings for agency theory. Research Findings/Insights Confrontational shareholder activism of the kind practiced by A merican and B ritish hedge funds in J apan during the 2000s failed to gain acceptance from J apanese investors and managers or to alter the internal focus of corporate governance practices in J apanese firms. Theoretical/Academic Implications We use a qualitative research design which treats the standard agency‐theoretical model of the firm as only one possible approach to understanding corporate governance, to be tested through empirical research, rather than as an assumption built into the analysis. We find that J apanese managers do not generally regard themselves as the shareholders' agents and that, conversely, shareholders in J apanese firms do not generally behave as principals. Our findings suggest that the standard principal‐agent model may be a weak fit for firms in certain national contexts. Practitioner/Policy Implications For policymakers, our work demonstrates the importance of understanding the distinctive features of national‐level corporate governance arrangements. For practitioners, it cautions against the view that national corporate governance systems are converging around the model of shareholder primacy and directs attention to the need for investors to be informed of the diversity of practices across different countries.