IPO Timing, Buyout Sponsors’ Exit Strategies, and Firm Performance of RLBOs
研究了收购发起人选择IPO时机对杠杆收购重组过程和退出策略的影响，发现热IPO市场下LBO持续时间更短，但随后反向杠杆收购绩效恶化、破产风险更高，表明市场时机压倒了运营效率提升。
Abstract This paper studies the impact of buyout sponsors’ initial public offering (IPO) timing on the leveraged buyout (LBO) restructuring process and subsequent exit strategies. I find that LBO duration is negatively related to hot IPO market conditions. Further, following IPOs, reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) with shorter LBO duration experience greater deterioration of performance and higher probability of bankruptcy. This suggests that sponsors’ efforts to enhance operating efficiency succumb to market timing. IPO timing does not affect sponsors’ exit strategies and monitoring post IPO. Sponsors keep an active long-run presence with more reputable sponsors who are more likely to exit by facilitating takeovers.