The Use of Relational Discrimination to Manage Market Entry: When Do Social Status and Structural Holes Work Against You?
研究在位企业如何通过关系歧视来应对市场进入威胁，发现企业会根据进入者的社会地位和结构洞机会，选择合作或排斥，并用1991-1997年商业银行进入投资银行业的数据验证。
This study examines how incumbent firms use relational discrimination to manage threats from market entry. The use of relationships to manage market entry implies that incumbent firms decide to collaborate with entering firms instead of incumbent firms on the basis of the extent to which entering firms threaten their own market positions. I argue that incumbent firms seeking collaborators switch between favoring and disfavoring entering firms compared to incumbent firms depending on their social status and brokerage opportunities. Comprehensive data on commercial banks' entry into investment banking in the period 1991 to 1997 provide empirical support for my arguments.