Competition and Bank Opacity
利用美国1980-1990年代银行放松管制的州际差异，研究发现竞争加剧降低了银行贷款损失准备的异常应计和财务报表重述频率，表明竞争能减少银行不透明性，有助于市场监督。
Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public? By integrating the gravity model of investment with the state-specific process of bank deregulation that occurred in the United States from the 1980s through the 1990s, we develop a bank-specific, time-varying measure of deregulation-induced competition. We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results suggest that competition reduces bank opacity, potentially enhancing the ability of markets to monitor banks. Received July 7, 2015; accepted February 4, 2016 by Editor Philip Strahan.