Superstition and Rational Learning
论证在理性学习和参与者有耐心的条件下，部分迷信可以持续存在，并以汉谟拉比法典中的“河中生存上诉”为例说明，偏离均衡两步以上的迷信比仅偏离一步的更可能持续。
We argue that some, but not all, superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the Code of Hammurabi. The code specified an “appeal by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. According to our theory, a mechanism that uses superstitions two or more steps off the equilibrium path, such as “appeal by surviving in the river,” is more likely to persist than a superstition where the false beliefs are only one step off the equilibrium path.