Executive compensation and the split share structure reform in China
研究中国股权分置改革如何使国有股东财富与股价更紧密关联，进而增强国企高管薪酬与股市表现的挂钩，尤其对控股股东有更强激励改善股价回报的企业效果更显著。
The split share structure reform in China enables state shareholders of listed firms to trade their restricted shares. This renders the wealth of state shareholders more strongly related to share price movements. We predict that this reform will create remuneration arrangements that strengthen the relationship between Chinese firms’ executive pay and stock market performance. We confirm this prediction by showing that there is such an effect among state-controlled firms, and especially those where the dominant shareholders have a greater incentive to improve share return performance. Our results indicate that this reform strengthens the accountability of executives to external monitoring by the stock market, and therefore benefits minority shareholders in China.