不完全信息与交错价格设定

Imperfect Information and Staggered Price Setting

American Economic Review · 1986
被引 56
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

解释企业为何在不同时间调整价格(交错定价),建立模型说明企业因对经济状况了解不完整,通过观察他人定价获取信息,导致交错定价成为均衡结果,且可能增加总体波动但仍是社会最优。

Abstract

Many Keynesian macroeconomic models are based on the assumption that firms change prices at different times. This paper presents an explanation for this "staggered" price setting. The authors develop a model in which firms have imperfect knowledge of the current state of the economy and gain information by observing the prices set by others. This gives each firm an incentive to set its price shortly after other firms set theirs. Staggering can be the equilibrium outcome. In addition, the information gains can make staggering socially optimal even though it increases aggregate fluctuations. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.

信息摩擦价格粘性交错定价信息外部性