Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets
将不完全竞争的搜索理论模型融入标准的不对称信息模型，刻画唯一均衡，分析逆向选择、筛选与不完全竞争的相互作用，发现逆向选择严重程度与市场势力集中度共同决定交易量及价格，且竞争加剧或信息不对称减少可能降低福利。
We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into a standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We characterize the unique equilibrium and use our characterization to explore the interaction between adverse selection, screening, and imperfect competition. We show that the relationship between an agent’s type, the quantity he trades, and the price he pays is jointly determined by the severity of adverse selection and the concentration of market power. Therefore, quantifying the effects of adverse selection requires controlling for market structure. We also show that increasing competition and reducing informational asymmetries can decrease welfare.