The Cost of Bank Regulatory Capital
利用巴塞尔I对短期与长期承诺的不同资本要求，研究发现银行会调整信贷结构和定价以降低监管资本成本，资本不足的银行尤其愿意牺牲更多费用收入来减少资本占用。
Abstract Basel I introduced capital requirements for undrawn commitments, but only for revolvers with an original maturity greater than one year. We use this regulatory discontinuity to estimate the impact of capital regulation on the cost and composition of credit. Following Basel I, short-term commitment fees declined relative to long-term commitments and issuance of short-term facilities increased. Our results highlight the sensitivity of credit provision to capital regulation, particularly for banks with less capital. We are able to infer that low-capital banks are willing to forego twice as much income from fees to reduce required regulatory capital by a dollar.