Endogenous Agency Problems and the Dynamics of Rents
研究了更复杂的任务虽能提高生产力，但也会产生更大的代理租金，代理人倾向于学习复杂技能以获取高租金，而代际间的不完全竞争导致均衡复杂度和租金逐渐超出最优水平。
Abstract While potentially more productive, more complex tasks generate larger agency rents. Agents therefore prefer to acquire complex skills, to earn large rents. In our overlapping generations model, their ability to do so is kept in check by competition with predecessors. Old agents, however, are imperfect substitutes for young ones, because the latter are easier to incentivize, thanks to longer horizons. This reduces competition between generations, enabling young managers to go for larger complexity than their predecessors. Consequently, equilibrium complexity and rents gradually increase beyond what is optimal for the principal and for society.