AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEMS: TRANSPARENCY, DONATIONS, AND POLICY CHOICES
通过实验室实验，研究了三种不同透明度的竞选融资制度（完全匿名、部分匿名、无匿名）对捐款、选举结果、政策选择和社会福利的影响，发现无匿名和部分匿名下候选人会回应捐款而偏向捐赠者，完全匿名最能限制捐款对政策的影响。
We experimentally study the transparency effect of alternative campaign finance systems on donations, election outcomes, policy choices, and welfare. Three alternatives are considered: one where donors' preferences and donations are unobserved by the candidate and public; one where they are observed by the candidate but not the public; and one where they are observed by all. We label them full anonymity ( FA ), partial anonymity ( PA ), and no anonymity ( NA ), respectively. We find that in NA and PA candidates consistently respond to donations by choosing policies favoring the donors. FA , in contrast, is the most successful in limiting the influence of donations on policy choices. Donors benefit greatly from the possibility of donations whereas social welfare may be harmed in some treatments. To our knowledge, this article is the first to investigate the effect of different campaign finance systems distinguished by their transparency level.