Underpricing and Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses in IPOs: Theory and Evidence
构建模型分析企业家在IPO中如何通过选择承销商和上市交易所等决策来影响抑价水平，以最小化自身财富损失，并用美国IPO数据验证了理论预测。
We model owners as solving a multidimensional problem when taking their firms public. Owners can affect the level of underpricing through the choices they make in promoting an issue, such as which underwriter to hire or on what exchange to list. The benefits of reducing underpricing in this way depend on the owners’ participation in the offering and the magnitude of the dilution they suffer on retained shares. We argue that the extent to which owners trade off underpricing and promotion is determined by the minimization of their wealth losses. Evidence from a sample of U.S. initial public offering confirms our empirical predictions.