Recruiting the CEO from the Board: Determinants and Consequences
研究了从董事会中招募CEO这一日益普遍的继任策略，发现计划性继任与应急性继任的市场反应和绩效表现不同，应急性继任导致负面市场反应和绩效下滑。
We investigate an increasingly prevalent CEO succession strategy: recruiting CEOs from the board of directors (director–CEOs). Director–CEOs might be hired in a planned succession because they combine outsiders’ new perspectives with insiders’ firm-specific knowledge. Alternatively, directors may be recruited when the board is unprepared for a leadership change. We find that unplanned successions, in which director–CEOs are appointed as a “quick-fix” solution, result in a negative market reaction, deterioration in performance, and ill-fitting candidates with shorter tenures. Conversely, firms recruiting director–CEOs in planned successions perform similarly to other firms. We find no evidence that poor firm quality drives these results.