Dynamic Asset Sales with a Feedback Effect
研究了场外资产出售中，卖方薪酬与股价挂钩时，市场反应如何反馈影响卖方的出售时机和价格决策，并解释了公司剥离的特征和市场流动性枯竭现象。
Abstract I analyze a dynamic model of over-the-counter asset sales in which the seller receives stock-sensitive compensation, and the transaction conveys information about the firm’s value. I examine how the market’s response to an asset sale feeds back to the seller’s decision on the timing and the sale price and analyze the unique pattern of stock prices before and after the sale. The implications of bargaining power, inventories, gains from synergy, and the introduction of a vesting period are discussed. The model sheds light on observed properties of corporate sell-offs and explains market dry-ups during downturn periods. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.