Covenants, Creditors’ Simultaneous Equity Holdings, and Firm Investment Policies
研究债权人同时持有债务和股权如何影响企业投资政策，发现双重所有权企业贷款合同中较少有资本支出限制，且违约后更易获得无条件豁免，有助于缓解股东与债权人冲突。
This article analyzes how creditors’ simultaneous debt and equity holdings affect firm investment policies. We find that firms with dual ownership are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in loan contracts, and the relation varies in predicted ways with the monitoring needs of borrowers and the monitoring capacity of dual owners. A less frequent use of capital expenditure restrictions, however, does not result in borrowers’ risk-shifting. Dual ownership firms are also more likely to be granted an unconditional waiver and do not significantly reduce debt issuance or investment expenditures after a financial covenant violation. Our results highlight how dual ownership can help mitigate shareholder–creditor conflicts.