Staging of Venture Financing, Investor Opportunism and Patent Law
分析分阶段融资在应对外部不确定性时虽提供实物期权价值，但可能因知识产权保护不足引发投资者敲竹杠，进而削弱企业家努力；通过将投资者剩余现金流权与上一阶段可验证的里程碑挂钩，或采用股权关联融资，可抑制投资者窃取创意的机会主义行为。
Abstract: Stage financing provides a real option that is valuable when facing external uncertainty. However, it may also induce investor hold‐up, if the property rights on an invention are not sufficiently protected. As a consequence, the entrepreneur may not work hard. Investor opportunism is less likely to occur, if investors' residual cash‐flow‐rights are contingent on verifiable ‘milestones’ in the previous stage. Equity‐linked financing also provides high‐powered incentives to the investor not to ‘steal the idea’ because his payoff becomes sensitive to the project value. The paper provides a new explanation for both types of contractual provisions.