Optimal Labor-Market Policy in Recessions
在搜索匹配模型中纳入风险厌恶工人、内生雇佣与离职以及不可观测的搜寻努力，研究了如何通过生产税、职位补贴、离职税和失业救济金实现约束有效配置，并校准美国数据发现衰退时应大幅持续提高雇佣补贴和离职税。
Within a search and matching model with risk-averse workers, endogenous hiring and separation, and unobservable search effort, we show how to decentralize the constrained-efficient allocation by a combination of a production tax and three labor-market policy instruments: vacancy subsidies, layoff taxes, and unemployment benefits. We derive analytical expressions for the optimal mix of these over the business cycle. Calibrating the model to the US economy under the assumption that wages are rigid, we find that hiring subsidies and layoff taxes should rise considerably and persistently in recessions. The optimal variation in unemployment benefits, in contrast, is quantitatively small and short-lived.