Does Securitization of Corporate Loans Lead to Riskier Lending?
研究发现，银行出售给担保贷款凭证（CLO）的贷款表现差于同一银行发放的未证券化贷款，原因是银行在定价时较少依赖借款人风险信息，且自身保留的风险敞口更小。
This paper finds that loans sold to collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) underperform matched unsecuritized loans originated by the same bank. We find that banks put less weight on the hard information on borrower risk available to them when they set interest rates on the loans they sell to CLOs, and that they retain less skin in the game on these loans, suggesting that lax underwriting standards contributed to the worse performance of securitized loans. We also find that the median non‐CLO syndicate participant retains a lower stake in securitized loans when compared to loans that are not securitized, suggesting that these investors, like lead banks, expected securitized loans to perform worse.