Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement
研究厄瓜多尔企业收到收入差异通知后的反应，发现多数企业不回应，回应企业虽增加报告收入但同步增加成本，导致税收增长有限。
Reducing tax evasion is a priority for many governments. A growing literature argues that verifying taxpayer reports against third-party information is critical for tax collection. However, effectiveness can be limited when tax authorities face constraints to credible enforcement and taxpayers make offsetting adjustments on other margins. We exploit a policy intervention in which Ecuadorian firms were notified about detected revenue discrepancies. Most firms simply failed to respond. Firms that responded increased reported revenue, matching the discrepancy amount when provided. However, they also increased reported costs by 96 cents per dollar of revenue adjustment, resulting in minor increases in tax collection.