Better Policies from Policy-Selective Aid?
研究发现，世界银行等援助机构近年来的政策选择性援助（即根据受援国政策质量分配援助）能激励受援国改善政策，全球政策选择性援助水平与受援国政策质量之间存在微弱但统计显著的正相关关系。
Abstract The increased policy selectivity of aid allocations observed in recent years provides aid-recipient countries with an incentive to improve policies. The paper estimates that a change in the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment policy index from 1.5 to 2 for a recipient is associated with an increase of about 13 percent in aid. The analysis also finds a modest but statistically significant positive relationship between the global level of policy-selective aid and policy, suggesting that policy-selective aid improves policies in aid-recipient countries. This effect is properly identified, as the level of policy-selective aid in the global aid budget is exogenous to a recipient country’s policy choice. Furthermore, the paper provides a game-theoretic model that establishes the link between the policy selectivity of the global budget and better recipient-country policies in equilibrium.