Options in Compensation: Promises and Pitfalls
研究了在委托代理框架下，如何设计最优薪酬合同以同时激励经理人的努力和风险投资行为，发现股票加期权方案能有效克服风险规避，但可能引发过度冒险，需要设置薪酬上限。
ABSTRACT We derive the optimal compensation contract in a principal–agent setting in which outcome is used to provide incentives for both effort and risky investments. To motivate investment, optimal compensation entails rewards for high as well as low outcomes, and it is increasing at the mean outcome to motivate effort. If rewarding low outcomes is infeasible, compensation consisting of stocks and options is a near‐efficient means of overcoming the manager's induced aversion to undertaking risky investments, whereas stock compensation is not. However, stock plus option compensation may induce excessively risky investments, and capping pay can be important in curbing such behavior.