Debtholder Monitoring Incentives and Bank Earnings Opacity
利用债务优先权结构的外生立法变化，研究发现增加非存款债权人在破产中的损失会降低银行盈余不透明性，尤其对非存款融资占比高、上市和独立银行影响更大。
Abstract We exploit exogenous legislative changes that alter the priority structure of different classes of debt to study how debtholder monitoring incentives affect bank earnings opacity. We present novel evidence that exposing nondepositors to greater losses in bankruptcy reduces earnings opacity, especially for banks with larger shares of nondeposit funding, listed banks, and independent banks. The reduction in earnings opacity is driven by a lower propensity to overstate earnings and is more pronounced among larger banks and in banks with more real estate loan exposure. Our findings highlight the importance of creditors’ monitoring incentives in improving the quality of information disclosure.