Auctions versus negotiations: the effects of inefficient renegotiation
研究了在复杂商品采购中，当无法通过完全合同实现高效重新谈判时，买方应在价格拍卖与双边谈判之间如何选择，发现谈判在特定条件下更优。
For the procurement of complex goods, the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If the buyer can specify the main characteristics of possible design improvements in a complete contingent contract, scoring auctions implement the efficient allocation. If this is not feasible, the buyer must choose between a price‐only auction (discouraging early information exchange) and bilateral negotiations with a preselected seller (reducing competition). Bilateral negotiations are superior if potential design improvements are important, if renegotiation is very costly, and if the buyer's bargaining position is strong. Moreover, negotiations provide stronger incentives for sellers to investigate design improvements.