Selling information to competitive firms
研究信息提供市场结构如何影响信息精度，发现垄断信息提供者可能向完全竞争企业提供不精确信息，即使提高精度无成本，因为更精确的信息会降低最终产品价格，减少企业支付意愿。
Abstract Internal agency conflicts distort firms' choices and reduce social welfare. To limit these distortions, principals dealing with privately informed agents often acquire information from specialized intermediaries, such as auditing and certification companies, that are able to ascertain, and credibly disclose, agents' private information. We study how the structures of both the information provision and the final good markets affect information accuracy. A monopolistic information provider may supply imprecise information to perfectly competitive firms, even if the precision of this information can be increased at no cost. This is due to a price effect of information: although more accurate information reduces agency costs and allows firms to increase production, it also results in a lower price in the final good market, which reduces principals' willingness to pay for information.