Impact of Excess Auditor Remuneration on the Cost of Equity Capital around the World
研究了全球市场中超额审计师报酬与股权隐含必要报酬率的关系，发现仅在投资者保护较强的国家，超额报酬会因损害审计独立性而提高资本成本。
This study examines the relation between excess auditor remuneration and the implied required rate of return (IRR hereafter) on equity capital in global markets. We conjecture that when auditor remuneration is excessively large, investors may perceive the auditor to be economically bonded to the client, leading to a lack of independence. This perceived lack of independence increases the information risk associated with the credibility of financial statements, thereby increasing IRR. Consistent with this notion, we find that IRR is increasing in excess auditor remuneration, but only in countries with stronger investor protection. Finding evidence of a relation only in stronger investor protection countries is consistent with the more prominent role of audited financial statements for investors' decisions in these countries. In settings in which investors are less likely to rely on audited financial statements and instead rely on alternative sources of information (i.e., in countries with weaker investor protection), the impact of client-auditor bonding should have less of an effect on investors' decisions.