OPTIMAL CARTEL PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ANTITRUST AUTHORITY*
研究了一个价格固定卡特尔在担心引起反垄断怀疑时的动态定价行为，发现稳态价格与损害倍数和检测概率负相关，但与固定罚款金额无关，且使用更具竞争性的基准价格计算损害时卡特尔定价更高。
The dynamic behavior of a price‐fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed. Consistent with preceding static theories, the cartel's steady‐state price is decreasing in the damage multiple and the probability of detection. However, contrary to those theories, it is independent of the level of fixed fines. It is also shown that the cartel prices higher when a more competitive benchmark price is used in calculating damages.