Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes
研究投票交易市场的竞争均衡理论，发现交易会导致独裁结果，且在委员会足够大或价值分布不极端时，投票市场相比简单多数决会造成福利损失，并通过实验室实验验证。
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilibrium and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilibrium we characterize always results in dictatorship if there is any trade, and the market for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or the distribution of values is not very skewed. We test the theoretical implications in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multiunit double auction.