Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
通过实验室模拟无限重复囚徒困境博弈，发现未来阴影不仅显著减少机会主义行为，其影响还紧密符合理论预测，为理解重复博弈中的合作提供了实证证据。
While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how “the shadow of the future” affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). I find that the shadow of the future matters not only by significantly reducing opportunistic behavior, but also because its impact closely follows theoretical predictions.