Desertion as theft
从经济学视角首次理论化处理逃兵问题，基于产权分析构建“逃兵即盗窃”框架，并用拿破仑法国的定性与定量证据检验其经验含义。
Abstract To be effective, an army must contain the extent of desertion among its ranks. This phenomenon rose to particular prominence in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries, with the appearance of the figure of the “citizen-soldier” on the battlefield. This paper offers the first theoretical treatment of the issue of desertion from an economic perspective. Building on the work of Yoram Barzel on the “economic analysis of property rights,” we develop a “desertion as theft” framework. We then test the empirical implications of the framework against qualitative and quantitative evidence from Napoleonic France.