Double bank runs and liquidity risk management
研究了银行同时面临存款和信用额度挤兑的双重风险，利用2007年欧洲银行间市场冻结和意大利信贷登记数据，发现事前银行间风险暴露与事后信用额度提取的正相关关系，源于银行主动的流动性风险管理。
By providing liquidity to depositors and credit line borrowers, banks are exposed to doubleruns on assets and liabilities. For identification, we exploit the 2007 freeze of the European interbank market and the Italian Credit Register. After the shock, there are sizeable, aggregate double-runs. In the cross-section, pre-shock interbank exposure is (unconditionally) unrelated to post-shock credit line drawdowns. However, conditioning on firm observable and unobservable characteristics, higher pre-shock interbank exposure implies more post-shock drawdowns. We show that is the result of active pre-shock liquidity risk management by more exposed banks granting credit lines to firms that run less in a crisis.