WHEN DOES DETERMINACY IMPLY EXPECTATIONAL STABILITY?
研究在纯前瞻模型中，理性预期均衡的确定性是否意味着该均衡的可学习性，并找出确定性蕴含或不蕴含可学习性的条件，以及长视野预测对可学习性的影响，最后应用于新凯恩斯模型。
Since the introduction of rational expectations, there have been issues with multiple equilibria and equilibrium selection. We study the connections between determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium and learnability of that equilibrium in a general class of purely forward‐looking models. Our framework is sufficiently flexible to encompass lags in agents' information and either finite horizon or infinite horizon approaches to learning. We are able to isolate conditions under which determinacy does and does not imply learnability and also conditions under which long‐horizon forecasts make a clear difference for learnability. Finally, we apply our result to a relatively general New Keynesian model.