The Information Role of Conservatism
论证公司内部人与外部股权投资者之间的信息不对称会导致财务报表保守主义，保守主义能减少经理人操纵会计数字的动机和能力，从而降低信息不对称及其带来的无谓损失，提升公司和股权价值。实证检验支持信息不对称与保守主义正相关，且信息不对称的变化导致保守主义变化，而非相反。
In this paper we argue that information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside equity investors generates conservatism in financial statements. Conservatism reduces the manager's incentives and ability to manipulate accounting numbers and so reduces information asymmetry and the deadweight losses that information asymmetry generates. This increases firm and equity values. Our empirical tests are consistent with our proposition that information asymmetry is significantly positively related to conservatism after controlling for other demands for conservatism. Further, our tests are more consistent with our prediction that changes in information asymmetry between equity investors lead to changes in conservatism than the FASB's proposition that conservatism produces information asymmetry among equity investors. An important implication is that, if the FASB was successful in meeting its stated goal of eliminating conservatism, then it would increase information asymmetry between investors, not reduce it. This outcome is inconsistent with the objectives of the Securities Acts.