Bank Loans Versus Bond Finance: Implications for Sovereign Debtors
分析主权债务人在银行贷款与债券融资之间的最优选择，发现若评级机构公开监督借款人，选择取决于违约危机成本与道德风险成本的权衡；危机成本大时，短期用银行贷款、长期用债券发行。
This article analyses the optimal choice between bank loans and bond finance for a sovereign debtor. It shows that if borrowers can be 'publicly monitored' by a rating agency that disseminates the information about their creditworthiness, their choice between bank loans and bond finance is determined by the trade-off between two deadweight costs: the crisis cost of default and the cost of debtor moral hazard. If crisis costs are large, sovereigns use bank loans for short-term financing and bond issuance for long-term financing. I also demonstrate that state contingent debt and IMF intervention can improve welfare. Copyright 2006 Bank of England.