Taxation and Redistribution of Residual Income Inequality
研究了劳动力市场存在搜索与匹配摩擦时，如何通过失业补助和累退劳动所得税实现最优收入再分配，对劳动经济学和公共政策研究者有参考价值。
This paper studies the optimal redistribution of income inequality caused by the presence of search and matching frictions in the labor market. We study this problem in the context of a directed search model of the labor market populated by homogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms. The optimal redistribution can be attained using a positive unemployment benefit and an increasing and regressive labor income tax. The positive unemployment benefit serves the purpose of lowering the search risk faced by workers. The increasing and regressive labor tax serves the purpose of aligning the cost to the firm of attracting an additional applicant with the value of an application to society.