Loan Sales and Borrowers’ Accounting Conservatism
研究发现，企业在首次出售贷款后，会计稳健性显著下降，且当贷款方监督激励较弱或企业自身提供稳健性的动机较低时，下降更明显。这为贷款牵头方通过监督激励影响企业会计行为提供了证据。
ABSTRACT We examine whether initial loan sales in the secondary loan market relate to borrowing firms’ accounting conservatism. We find that borrowing firms exhibit a significant decline in accounting conservatism after the initial loan sales. We show that the decline in borrower conservatism is more pronounced for firms that borrow from lenders with lower monitoring incentives and for firms that have lower incentives to supply conservatism. The baseline results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. Collectively, we provide corroborative evidence that lead lenders’ monitoring incentives enforce accounting conservatism in the private debt market, and that lead lenders play a more prominent role than secondary loan market participants in shaping corporate (conservative) reporting.