Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed
研究失业工人如何最优地安排失业救济金的时间，以及是否允许借贷和储蓄。发现当工人具有常数绝对风险厌恶时，简单政策（固定失业救济、固定就业税、自由存取无风险资产）最优；而常数相对风险厌恶时，最优政策接近固定救济金，更复杂的政策福利增益极小。
We study unemployment insurance for workers who sequentially sample job opportunities. We focus on the optimal timing of benefits and the desirability of allowing borrowing and saving. When workers have constant absolute risk aversion, a simple policy is optimal: a constant benefit during unemployment, a constant tax during employment, and free access to a riskless asset. With constant relative risk aversion, optimal policy involves nearly constant benefits; more elaborate policies offer minuscule welfare gains. We highlight two distinct policy roles: ensuring workers have sufficient liquidity to smooth their consumption; and providing unemployment subsidies to insure against uncertain spell duration.