Inside Debt and Bank Risk
研究发现美国银行高管持有的内部债务与银行风险负相关，内部债务高的银行资产质量更好、经营更保守，表明债务薪酬能抑制银行冒险行为。
Abstract Inside debt compensation held by top officers of U.S. banks is negatively related to risk and risk taking. The evidence reveals a robust and strongly negative relation between end-of-2006 inside debt and 2007–2009 bank-specific risk exposures in terms of lost stock market value, volatility, tail risk, and the probability of financial distress. Banks with managers having large inside debt holdings are also characterized by better-quality assets, more conservative balance sheet management, and a stronger tendency toward traditional banking activities. The results suggest that debt-based compensation limits bank risk and risk taking by encouraging more conservative decision making.