Communication and authority with a partially informed expert
分析了Crawford-Sobel式发送者-接收者博弈，其中发送者仅对部分收益相关因素有专业知识，剩余不确定性通过有效偏差统计量影响信息传递质量，发现信息传递质量与剩余不确定性的风险性无关，且将权威分配给知情方可能并非最优。
A sender‐receiver game a la Crawford‐Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff‐relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the effective bias. For symmetrically distributed residual uncertainty or quadratic loss functions, (i) the quality of information transmission is independent of the riskiness of residual uncertainty, (ii) it may be suboptimal to allocate authority to the informed player, (iii) despite players' preferences being arbitrarily close, it is impossible to assert that the receiver prefers delegation over authority or vice versa.