Insider Trading and Financing Constraints
研究了内幕交易对融资约束的影响，发现总体上内幕交易加剧融资约束，但买入交易的信息效应占主导，且仅执行董事的交易与融资约束显著相关。
Abstract Insider trading may alleviate financing constraints by conveying value‐relevant information to the market (the information effect) or may exacerbate financing constraints by impairing market liquidity and distorting insiders’ incentives to disclose value‐relevant information (the confidence effect). We examine the significance of these two contrasting effects by investigating the link between insider trading and financing constraints as measured by the investment‐cash flow sensitivity. We find that, overall insider trading exacerbates financing constraints; however the information effect dominates the confidence effect for insider purchases. Only trades by executive directors are significantly related to financing constraints.