The Market for News
研究新闻市场，假设读者喜欢看到自己信念被证实的报道，而报纸可以偏向这些信念。竞争导致价格降低，但在读者信念一致的话题上，媒体会共同偏向读者偏见；在信念分歧的话题上，报纸细分市场并走向极端立场。总体而言，读者异质性比竞争本身对媒体准确性更重要。
We investigate the market for news under two assumptions: that readers hold beliefs which they like to see confirmed, and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs. We show that, on the topics where readers share common beliefs, one should not expect accuracy even from competitive media: competition results in lower prices, but common slanting toward reader biases. On topics where reader beliefs diverge (such as politically divisive issues), however, newspapers segment the market and slant toward extreme positions. Yet in the aggregate, a reader with access to all news sources could get an unbiased perspective. Generally speaking, reader heterogeneity is more important for accuracy in media than competition per se.