SELF-ESTEEM, MORAL CAPITAL, AND WRONGDOING
构建了一个无限期规划者-执行者模型，研究个体面对随机诱惑时如何通过抵制诱惑积累道德资本，以及经济冲击如何通过破坏道德资本导致长期不当行为。
We present an infinite-horizon planner–doer model of moral standards, where individuals receive random temptations (such as bribe offers) and must decide which to resist. Individual actions depend both on conscious deliberation and on a type reflecting unconscious drives. Temptations yield consumption value, but confidence in being the type of person who resists temptations yields self-esteem. We identify conditions for individuals to build an introspective reputation for goodness ("moral capital") and for good actions to lead to a stronger disposition to do good. Bad actions destroy moral capital and lock-in further wrongdoing. Economic shocks that result in higher temptations have long-lasting effects on wrongdoing. We show how optimal deterrence can change under endogenous moral costs and how wrongdoing can be compounded as high temptation activities attract individuals with low moral capital.