The Sick Pay Trap
基于挪威准自然实验，研究发现短期病假工资责任制度导致企业不愿让长期病假员工返岗，形成“病假工资陷阱”，该抑制效应在统计和经济上均显著。
In most countries, employers are financially responsible for sick pay during an initial period of a worker's absence spell, after which the public insurance system covers the bill. Based on an empirical evaluation of a quasi-natural experiment in Norway, where pay liability was removed for pregnancy-related absences, we show that the system of short-term pay liability creates a sick pay trap: firms are discouraged from letting long-term sick workers back into work since they then face the financial risk associated with subsequent relapses. We present evidence indicating that this disincentive effect is both statistically and economically significant.