Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment
研究了多个不耐烦投资者面对不可逆投资机会时的先发制人博弈，理论刻画了对称贝叶斯纳什均衡，并通过实验室实验验证了竞争会大幅降低投资触发值等主要定性预测。
Several impatient investors with private costs C i face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V-C i . We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model's main qualitative predictions: competition drastically lowers the value at which investment occurs; usually the lowest-cost investor preempts the other investors; observed investment patterns in competition (unlike monopoly) are quite insensitive to changes in the Brownian parameters. Support is more qualified for the prediction that markups decline with cost.