Restrictions on Managers' Outside Employment Opportunities and Asymmetric Disclosure of Bad versus Good News
研究发现美国各州采纳不可避免披露原则会限制管理者跳槽，导致企业更倾向于隐瞒坏消息，且这种效应因管理者职业担忧类型而异。
ABSTRACT This study examines the effect of restrictions on managers' outside employment opportunities on voluntary corporate disclosure. The recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by courts in the U.S. states in which the firms are headquartered places greater restrictions on their managers from joining or forming a rival company. We find that, on average, the IDD adoption increases the asymmetric withholding of bad news. We further show that the IDD adoption increases the asymmetric withholding of bad news relative to good news for firms whose managers are mainly concerned about losing their current job. However, an opposite effect is observed for firms whose managers are mainly interested in seeking promotion elsewhere. Furthermore, these effects are less pronounced for firms subject to greater monitoring of their disclosure policy. These results suggest that managers' career concerns affect corporate disclosure policy, and the effect varies with the type of career concerns. JEL Classifications: D82; M4.