A welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policies
通过比较28个移动电话市场的绩效指标，发现将更多带宽分配给持牌运营商并实现更具竞争性的市场结构，其效率收益通常超过许可证销售收入，因此频谱政策应关注产出市场效率而非拍卖收入。
Economic analysis of spectrum policy focuses on government revenues derived via competitive bidding for licenses. Auctions generating high bids are identified as “successful” and those with lower receipts as “fiascoes.” Yet spectrum policies that create rents impose social costs. Most obviously, rules favoring monopoly predictably increase license values but reduce welfare. This article attempts to shift analytical focus to efficiency in output markets. In performance metrics derived by comparing 28 mobile telephone markets, countries allocating greater bandwidth to licensed operators and achieving more competitive market structures are estimated to realize efficiencies that generally dominate those associated with license sales. Policies intended to increase auction receipts (e.g., reserve prices and subsidies for weak bidders) should be evaluated in this light.