Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking Industry: Table 1
研究银行竞争如何导致借款人信息分散，削弱银行筛选能力，使更多低质量借款人获得融资，并探讨金融放松管制对借款人剩余和银行进入模式的影响。
Proprietary information generated through the process of lending can impact the structure of the banking industry. With more competing banks, borrower-specific information becomes more disperse, as each bank becomes informed about a smaller pool of borrowers. This reduces banks' screening ability, creating an inefficiency as more low-quality borrowers obtain financing. Incumbent banks' information advantage may also create difficulties for potential entrants, so that entry should be easier in markets with high borrower turnover or where entrants have specific expertise in evaluating credit risks. We draw implications for whether financial deregulation is likely to increase borrowers' surplus, and what patterns of entry might be observed.