Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information
研究了当委托人的监督信息为私人（不可验证）时，如何通过及时调整代理人努力水平来恢复可信度，发现调整努力比纯货币惩罚更有效，且私人监督在存在合谋时比公共监督更高效。
When a principal's monitoring information is private (nonverifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent's wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources—the so‐called burning of money. A more realistic and efficient outcome is feasible when the private information arrives in time to rescale the agent's effort. Rescaling is more effective than pure monetary penalties because effort has different values to different parties whereas money is equally valuable to all parties. Furthermore, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion.