Strategic capacity investment under uncertainty
研究了双寡头企业在不确定动态环境下，如何同时决定投资时机和产能水平，发现先发者会过度投资以延迟对手进入并减少其产能，且不确定性越高越容易实现进入遏制。
This article considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and duopolistic framework. Each investment decision involves to determine the timing and the capacity level. The simultaneous analysis of timing and capacity decisions extends work on entry deterrence/accommodation to consider a timing/delay element. We find that, when applying an entry deterrence policy, the first investor, or incumbent, overinvests in capacity for two reasons. First, it delays the investment of the second investor, or entrant. Second, the entrant will invest in less capacity. We also find that greater uncertainty makes entry deterrence more likely.